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The world over, what political cause is celebrated more than human 
rights? The rule of law, perhaps. These two noble and important objects 
of civil government—both valued as of inestimable worth these days—
usually are complementary. Human rights are insecure without the rule 
of law to protect them, and what human right is more fundamental than 
the right to be treated in accordance with the law and not the whim of the 
mighty? Human rights and the rule of law seem to stand together. How 
then, when human rights and the rule of law stand opposed, and in 
circumstances where they most need each other’s mutual support and 
meet opposition enough from other forces? 
It is the thesis of this article that in East Africa human rights and the 
rule of law very likely stand opposed and cannot coexist. To be sure, 
some human rights can coexist with some notion of the rule of law in 
East Africa, as elsewhere. But for East Africa to play host to the full 
panoply of human rights as commonly supported by the international 
community and endorsed by East African nations themselves, and at the 
same time to play host to a rigorous practice of the rule of law, appears to 
be something that simply cannot be done. 
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The argument of this article is straightforward. Part I describes the 
rule of law, its importance, and (briefly) its treatment in East Africa. Part 
II describes human rights, their two major divisions, and (briefly) their 
treatment in East Africa. Part III explains how the rule of law and human 
rights collide in East Africa. The conclusion suggests that this collision is 
the result of an extravagant Western imperialism that has helped deprive 
East Africa both of human rights and of the rule of law.  
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND EAST AFRICA 
The rule of law is today more talked about in more places by more 
people than perhaps ever in its history, but that does not mean it is any 
clearer in meaning or significance, or better understood. Indeed, the 
term has been put to so many uses in recent years that it is difficult to 
see how anyone will ever be able plausibly to claim to have cornered 
the market.2  
  
 2. Martin Krygier, Inside the Rule of Law, 3 RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 
77, 77 (2014) (It.). As to the current celebrity of the rule of law, Amichai Magen has this 
to say: 
 At the outset of the twenty-first century, the rule of law is no 
longer a concept exclusively, or even primarily, defined and 
debated by political philosophers and constitutional lawyers, as 
had been the case in centuries past. Over the last decade [i.e., 
approximately the first of the third millennium] in particular, the 
rule of law has become “the motherhood and apple pie of 
development economics.” Western democracies, their regional 
organizations, NGOs, and the multilateral development agencies 
they control, now pour billions of dollars and euros into projects 
designed to measure the rule of law, create it where it does not 
exist—in closed dictatorships, failed states, and post-conflict 
zones—and to strengthen it in traditional and struggling 
democracies around the globe. Institutionalists of different hews 
[sic] have come to see it as central to modern statehood, impartial 
economic exchange, and objective justice. Democracy scholars 
are pointing to it as the essential, non-electoral dimension of 
democratic substance. Together with human rights and 
democracy, the rule of law is now upheld by liberal 
internationalists as a central pillar in the “virtuous trilogy” upon 
which a legitimate international order rests, while international 
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Indeed, the rule of law enjoys a superfluity of definitions. The major 
distinction among them, however, is simple enough. It is the distinction 
between formal definitions and substantive definitions.3 Formal 
definitions speak of civil government constrained by rules and of courts 
with power to apply these rules to government actors. Substantive 
definitions, going beyond the formal, speak also of the content of the 
rules, so that the rules embody principles of justice such as human rights. 
These two general types of definitions of the rule of law are to be found 
even in perhaps the earliest discussion of the rule of law, that of 
Aristotle: “We have to distinguish two senses of the rule of law—one 
which means adherence to such laws as have been enacted, and another 
which means that the laws obeyed have also been well enacted.”4   
A classic statement of the formal version of the rule of law appears in 
F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom: 
  Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country 
from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance 
in the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law. 
Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its 
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
  
security experts have come to see it as indispensable to ending 
civil wars, building durable peace, and fighting insurgencies, 
transnational crime, and terrorism. 
Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 
45 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 51, 52-53 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 82 (noting 
newfound popularity of the rule of law). As to the multiplicity of meanings of the rule of 
law, he notes, “Notwithstanding its pervasiveness as an ideal . . . the term is afflicted by 
an extraordinary divergence of understandings.” Id. at 55. 
 3. See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule 
of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 99, 104-07 (2004). 
Sometimes the literature calls the formal definitions “thin” and the substantive “thick.” 
So, by way of example, for a tale of the recent thickening of the concept of the rule of 
law from its classically thin state, see Magen, supra note 2, at 58-63. 
 4. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 175 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1971-72) (1946) (IV, viii, § 5; 1294a). For a short historical and theological 
review of the rule of law, including its treatment in the works of Aristotle, see Craig A. 
Stern, The Common Law and the Religious Foundations of the Rule of Law Before Casey, 
38 U.S.F. L. REV. 499 (2004). 
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will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. Though this ideal can 
never be perfectly achieved, since legislators as well as those to whom 
the administration of the law is entrusted are fallible men, the essential 
point, that the discretion left to the executive organs wielding coercive 
power should be reduced as much as possible, is clear enough. While 
every law restricts individual freedom to some extent by altering the 
means which people may use in the pursuit of their aims, under the 
Rule of Law the government is prevented from stultifying individual 
efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the 
individual is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that 
the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his 
efforts.5  
Hayek’s definition of the rule of law is formal in that it prescribes how 
law should operate generally rather than prescribing any particular 
content of the law. It is the certainty, stability, and notoriety of the law 
that matters, not the merit or justice of its requirements.6 
Slightly enlarging Hayek’s definition, though still squarely within the 








 5. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112-13 (Bruce Caldwell ed., definitive 
ed. 2007) (footnote omitted). Hayek explains later that the rule of law is not simply the 
mere accord with positive law. Unless the positive law possesses the qualities he 
describes in the paragraph quoted above, legality falls short of the rule of law. See id. at 
119. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and 
Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 913-14 (2008), for a 
brief description of two other formal versions of the rule of law similar to that of Hayek, 
those of Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz. 
 6. The author is reminded of a conversation he enjoyed over a picnic lunch with 
Malcolm Muggeridge and a few others during which Muggeridge impishly remarked that 
he had rather be governed by Joseph Stalin than by Eleanor Roosevelt because under 
Stalin one at least knew where one stood. 
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The rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound 
by and abide by the law.  
. . . . 
  This definition requires that there must be a system of laws—and 
law by its nature involves rules set forth in advance that are stated in 
general terms. A particular decision or an order made for an occasion is 
not a rule. The law must be generally known and understood. The 
requirements imposed by the law cannot be impossible for people to 
meet. The laws must be applied equally to everyone according to their 
terms. There must be mechanisms or institutions that enforce the legal 
rules when they are breached.7  
Tamanaha makes explicit what surely must be implicit in Hayek’s 
definition of the rule of law: The laws must speak in general terms, be 
applied to all generally, and be such that they can be obeyed. What he 
adds to these is the element of enforcement. The rule of law requires that 
the law in fact rule. Other similar definitions mention the role of courts in 
applying the law.8 At least one definition, attempting to describe what the 
rule of law means in the American context, includes the notion that 
persons aggrieved by certain government decisions have the opportunity 
to state their cases before independent decision makers whose decisions 
are to be well justified.9 All these definitions of the rule of law share the 
formal approach. General, prospective, publicized rules are to regulate 
the relations between civil government and others, whatever the content 
of those rules. 
Contrast such a formal understanding of the rule of law with a 
substantive understanding that brings within its ambit some constraint on 
  
 7. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 SING. 
J. LEGAL STUD. 232, 233 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous Position of the Rule of Law and 
the Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 6 (2013); John Mukum Mbaku, 
Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the 
Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 988-89 (2013). 
 9. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 
143, 145 (1958). 
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the content of law. A well-known and well regarded version of this type 
of understanding appears in a seminal essay by Thomas Carothers: 
  The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are 
public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. 
They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have 
gained status as universal human rights over the last half-century. In 
particular, anyone accused of crime has the right to a fair, prompt 
hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central 
institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and 
police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are 
impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or 
manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in 
a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will 
be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-
abiding.10  
Observe that the italicized sentence takes the definition of the rule of law 
beyond the formal to include the general protection of human rights. It is 
said that most scholarly definitions of the rule of law embrace such 
substantive elements, with those in the field of foreign-policy embracing 
human rights specifically.11 The maximalist substantive versions of the 
rule of law remind one of the second of Aristotle’s descriptions12: 
  The rule of law signifies “the empire of laws and not of men”: the 
subordination of arbitrary power and the will of public officials as 
much as possible to the guidance of laws made and enforced to serve 
their proper purpose, which is the public good (“res publica”) of the 
community as a whole. When positive laws or their interpretation or 
enforcement serve other purposes, there is no rule of law, in its fullest 
  
 10. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 
1998, at 95, 96 (emphasis added). 
 11. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the 
“Rule of Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2284 n.43 (2003). 
 12. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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sense, but rather “rule by law”—mere legalism—in service of arbitrary 
power.13  
Similar is the notion that the rule of law requires the positive law to align 
with the natural law. As Harold Berman explained, “The Rechtsstaat was 
to govern by law and was to be bound by, and not absolved from, the law 
which it made.”14 But “Rechtsstaat . . . is rule by law, not rule of law; it 
does not presuppose a fundamental law which is derived from a source 
outside the state and which the state is legally powerless to change.”15 
Such an approach to the rule of law is not satisfied with the regime 
described by Hayek and Tamanaha.16 It is not enough that civil 
government adhere to rules that are stable, general, and published. The 
rules must also accord with principles of justice or there is no rule of law. 
Clearly, the formal and the substantive—sometimes called the “thin” 
and the “thick”17—versions of the rule of law differ significantly. The 
substantive adds to the formal the requirement that civil government 
secure further elements of justice. The substantive, then, builds upon the 
formal. Whether the rule of law itself should include such additional, 
substantive requirements is a matter of some dispute. On the one hand, a 
rule of law assuring that a civil government uniformly follow iniquitous 
positive law may not be so golden a met-wand.18 As Professor Berman 
observed, “[t]heoretically, a fascist or other dictatorial regime can 
constitute a Rechtsstaat [i.e., a regime adhering to the ‘thin’ rule of 
law19]. Indeed, under German national socialism jurists defended the 
  
 13. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, What is the Rule of Law and Why is it so Important? 3 
(Univ. Balt. Sch. Law Legal Research Paper No. 2015-15, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445057. 
 14. Harold J. Berman, The Struggle for Law in Post-Soviet Russia, in WESTERN 
RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 41, 47 (András Sajó ed., 1996). 
 15. Id. at 48. 
 16. See supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Krygier, supra note 2, at 78. 
 18. Sir Edward Coke called English law a “golden met-wand” that measures 
human acts uniformly and authoritatively—an instrument of the rule of law. Prohibitions 
del Roy, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 63. 
 19. See supra notes 3, 4, 14 and accompanying text. 
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sentencing of persons to concentration camps on the ground that the 
German state was a Rechtsstaat.”20 On the other hand, 
[I]f excessively thin conceptions often seem urgently in need of a feed, 
to enable any distinction between the rule of law and law in general, 
thick theories are commonly vulnerable to Joseph Raz’s charge that: 
[I]f the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its 
nature is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the 
term lacks any useful function. We have no need to be converted to 
the rule of law just in order to discover that to believe in it is to 
believe that good should triumph.21  
To define the rule of law to include human rights and democracy, 
Professor Tamanaha remarks, “smacks of stuffing the meaning of the 
rule of law with contestable normative presuppositions to produce a 
desired or presupposed outcome which is then imposed on everyone by 
definitional fiat.”22 However that may be, it is enough for the purposes of 
this article to emphasize that the substantive definitions of the rule of law 
incorporate the formal as well. Consequently, if a legal system fails to 
meet the standards of the formal version of the rule of law, it fails to 
meet the standards of the substantive version also. 
Furthermore, when it comes to including human rights in the 
substantive version of the rule of law, the very definition of the rule of 
law may make of it something out of reach. If, as this article argues, a 
civil government implementing a broad spectrum of human rights courts 
violating the formal version of the rule of law, the substantive version in 
this context approaches an oxymoron. How convenient, then, for regimes 
that slight the rule of law to hide behind a definition of the rule of law 
that itself helps excuse their violations. But if guaranteeing human rights 
may put the rule of law at risk, apart from the rule of law there can be 
little security for human rights. However generous a government’s law 
  
 20. Berman, supra note 14, at 48. 
 21. Krygier, supra note 2, at 78 (quoting JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its 
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 211 (1979)).  
 22. Tamanaha, supra note 7, at 234. 
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on human rights, that generosity is but idle if the government does not 
respect the law.23 
The very definition of the rule of law makes its universal importance 
obvious. And of late, “[t]he concept is suddenly everywhere—a 
venerable part of Western political philosophy enjoying a new run as a 
rising imperative of the era of globalization.”24 Brooks has observed that 
promotion of the rule of law commands the support of three (non-
exclusive) groups involved in the quest for development: the investment 
community, human rights activists, and those concerned with security.25 
There may be reason to doubt that the rule of law itself is so powerful a 
tool of development.26 All told, however, evidence demonstrates that the 
rule of law does in fact foster economic development at the least.27 
If the rule of law is important to development, East Africa is in sore 
need of the rule of law. Africa generally still awaits sound 
development.28 At the same time, and likely as a cause of its 
underdevelopment, Africa generally still awaits institutions effectively 
supporting the rule of law.29 Official corruption—a thing at odds with the 
rule of law—is endemic.30 South Sudan, for example, has seen billions of 
dollars looted from its treasury by senior officials.31 The law does not 
  
 23. “[I]n the realm of human rights, . . . the rule of law . . . is now offered as the 
key to the effective attainment of those rights.” Magen, supra note 2, at 82. 
 24. Carothers, supra note 10, at 95. 
 25. See Brooks, supra note 11, at 2276-77. 
 26. See Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule 
of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 160-61 (2004). 
 27. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 100-02; Davis & Trebilcock, 
supra note 5, at 896-905, 938-45; Magen, supra note 2, at 64. 
 28. See Mbaku, supra note 8, at 959-60. 
 29. See id. at 963. 
 30. Id. at 993-94, 1015-16. 
 31. Id. at 999 n.121, 1033. Similarly, it has been reported of Kenya that 
“corruption accounts for about eight percent of the country’s GDP; indeed, the names of 
honest ministers and senior government officials in [the government of a named 
president] ‘would fit on the back of a postage stamp.’” Nsongurua J. Udombana, Keeping 
the Promise: Improving Access to Socioeconomic Rights in Africa, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 135, 164 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting MARTIN MEREDITH, THE STATE OF 
AFRICA: A HISTORY OF FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 688 (Penguin Books 2006)). 
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afford mechanisms for citizens to hold such officials accountable.32 
Rather, “many Africans view their present legal and judicial institutions 
as alien impositions designed for the benefit of the ruling elites.”33 This 
alienation from law and civil government, exacerbated by the ethnic and 
religious diversity in Africa,34 offers its own challenge to the rule of law: 
Citizens must see the law as an instrument that they can use to deal 
effectively with everyday problems, including organizing their lives 
and peacefully resolving conflicts, including those that arise from trade 
and other forums of free exchange. If, however, citizens view the laws 
and institutions as “alien” impositions, used by the political elites to 
oppress and exploit them, they are more likely to refuse to recognize 
these laws, let alone obey them. Within such a context, compliance 
becomes very difficult—the police and other enforcement agencies 
may be totally overwhelmed and simply unable to perform their 
constitutionally assigned functions, effectively allowing society to 
degenerate into chaos and violence.35  
With civil government detached from actual governance, the rule of law 
can have no real life. Law must truly regulate the relationship between a 
civil government and its people for the rule of law to exist. A state of 
civil lawlessness is not the rule of law, however much what passes for 
the institutions of civil government may by themselves accord with the 
law. Playing a game according to the rules does nothing to bring rules to 
spectators. Moreover, if government actors in East Africa do not respect 
the reach of the law, neither will others. Such a compound and mutually 
reinforcing breach in the rule of law must frustrate the development East 
Africa sorely needs. 
 
  
 32. Mbaku, supra note 8, 1019. 
 33. Id. at 1036. 
 34. Id. at 1002. 
 35. Id. at 1004-05 (footnote omitted). 
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EAST AFRICA 
Part I of this article has presented a general treatment of the rule of 
law and a brief observation on the special challenges and needs of East 
Africa regarding the rule of law. Part II similarly will present a general 
treatment of human rights and then a brief observation on how they stand 
in East Africa. The parts share unhappy parallels. 
The cause of human rights is no less celebrated these days than that of 
the rule of law. In fact, recent years have seen “the development of 
human rights as a kind of world religion.”36 Not that human rights are 
wholly new-fangled: 
  We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men . . . .37   
What is new, however, is the breadth of rights now generally thought to 
be included in the list of human rights, specifically rights that civil 
government supply basic human needs rather than rights that civil 
government forbear to injure human beings. 
To be sure, the very existence of civil government is to supply a basic 
human need. The Declaration of Independence says as much. Civil 
government exists to secure civil justice or, in the words of the 
Declaration, “to secure” “unalienable Rights.” But traditionally, though 
civil government was to secure rights, no one was understood to have a 
right that the civil government do so.38 Rather, rights as against civil 
government limited its power as it went about doing justice and securing 
  
 36. Richard Stith, If Dorothy had not had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s 
Curtain: The Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 847, 
850 (2010). 
 37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Craig A. 
Stern & Gregory M. Jones, The Coherence of Natural Inalienable Rights, 76 UMKC L. 
REV. 939 (2008) (setting forth the longstanding tradition of natural inalienable rights). 
 38. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 
195-96 (1989). 
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rights. Political and legal history account for the development of such 
rights against the abuses of civil government, with government threats to 
liberty providing the impetus for the legal recognition of rights to set 
limits to government power.39 Armed with legal rights, the subjects of 
civil government could enlist the institutions of the law—courts above 
all—to protect themselves against the all-too-likely trespasses of civil 
government. 
These traditionally recognized rights against improper acts of the civil 
government are called “negative rights.”40 They are negative because 
they fundamentally call upon the civil government not to act. 
There is a thin and confusing line between government action and 
inaction, but a negative right is one that can always be satisfied by 
inaction of some kind (even if it may also alternatively be satisfied by a 
government action), while a positive right cannot be satisfied by 
inaction and intrinsically requires government action.41  
So, for example, rights against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
at the hands of the civil government are negative rights. They specify 
actions the civil government may not perform. They limit the power of 
civil government. 
Not so the other major category of rights against civil government, the 
so called “positive rights.”42 “One category [the negative] is a right to be 
  
 39. See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 868 
(2001). 
 40. See id. at 868-74. 
 41. Id. at 869 (footnote omitted). Elsewhere, Cross “propose[s] the following 
simple test for distinguishing between positive and negative rights—if there was [sic] no 
government in existence, would the right be automatically fulfilled?” Id. at 866. 
Notwithstanding, it is possible to see the categories of negative and of positive rights as 
“blur[ring] at the edges.” Helen Hershkoff, Forward: Positive Rights and the Evolution of 
State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 809 (2002) (proffering supposed examples of 
such blurring). 
 42. Positive rights also go by the name of “second-generation” rights, this in 
distinction from negative “first-generation” rights and from “third-generation” rights to 
such things as a clean environment and community development. See Abbie Sachs, 
Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?, 53 SMU. L. REV. 1381, 
1383-84 (2000). 
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free from government, while the other [the positive] is a right to 
command government action.”43 Positive rights call upon the civil 
government to supply a need, not simply to avoid an active transgression 
of its own. Positive rights, therefore, entail a political theory, a vision of 
the purpose and reach of civil government, whereas negative rights entail 
only a sense of what constitutes an “affirmative” injury to the person.44  
Two foundational instruments of the United Nations lend strong 
support to positive human rights against civil governments. The UN 
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948.45 While not itself legally binding, it embraces both negative and 
positive rights, like rights to work, fair wages, unions, public assistance, 
health care, and education.46 The other UN instrument, advocated by the 
Soviet Union and as yet unratified by the United States, embraces such 
positive rights almost entirely.47 This treaty, the International Covenant 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,48 the UN adopted in 1966.49 
  
 43. Cross, supra note 39, at 864. It should be noted at the outset of this discussion 
of positive rights that contemporary usage of this term departs from the usage of the early 
(first?) proponent of the similar dichotomy of negative and positive liberty. For Isaiah 
Berlin, negative liberty meant the freedom from obstruction, while positive liberty meant 
the freedom to effect one’s goals, including in the context of society as a whole. See 
Matthew Lewans, Rethinking the Diceyan Dialectic, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 75, 78, 91-95 
(2008). 
 44. The political theory supporting positive human rights has been espoused by 
socialists and Roman Catholic authorities. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten 
Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 27 (2003); Wiktor Osiatynski, Social and Economic Rights in a New 
Constitution for Poland, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION, supra 
note 14, at 233, 233, 255. Perhaps the most prominent supporter of positive human rights 
has been President Franklin D. Roosevelt. See Cross, supra note 39, at 858. 
 45. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human 
Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2008). 
 46. Posner, supra note 45, at 1764-65; Udombana, supra note 31, at 139 (“The 
UDHR guarantees a full complement of rights—civil and political, as well as economic, 
social and cultural—and provides that everyone has a right to an effective remedy for 
violations of these rights.”) (footnote omitted). 
 47. See Posner, supra note 45, at 1764-65. 
 48. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see Posner, supra note 45, at 1764. 
 49. Posner, supra note 45, at 1759 n.7. 
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 Positive and negative rights against civil government fundamentally 
differ from each other. At root, this difference rests upon a fundamental 
difference between the nature of positive and the nature of negative 
moral duties. Saint John Paul II explained: 
In the case of the positive moral precepts, prudence always has the task 
of verifying that they apply in a specific situation, for example, in view 
of other duties which may be more important or urgent. But the 
negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or 
kinds of behavior as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate 
exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable way, for 
the “creativity” of any contrary determination whatsoever. Once the 
moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely 
recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law 
and of refraining from the action which it forbids.50  
It is typical of negative duties that they may be categorical. It is typical 
of positive duties that likely they are not. Positive duties call for 
specifications and qualifications inessential to negative duties. 
The situation is similar with positive rights against civil government. 
So, for example, a right to be employed requires that the state decide 
who is best suited for any particular position.51 Or a right to health care 
may be guaranteed, but this right is to be situated in the context of given 
laws and practice, and may be limited by law.52 Whereas negative rights 
may be absolute, positive rights generally are contingent. 
[P]ositive rights are typically not just rights to have the state act but 
rights to have the state act effectively, i.e. rights to a result, such as the 
provision of water. But the future is always uncertain. Rainfall and 
climate may vary. Rules for action or inaction, the stuff of ordinary 
  
 50. JOHN PAUL II, THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH § 67, at 87 (Pauline Books & Media 
1993). 
 51. See HAYEK, supra note 5, at 121-22. 
 52. See Joachim Sanden & Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, The Right to Liberty and 
Security, Public Health and Disease Control, speakers at The Congress of the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies: “National Security and Public Health: Exceptions to Human 
Rights?” (May 29, 2014). 
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litigation, can in principle be clear and even absolute, but the means 
needed to effect results are always tentative and contingent.53  
This quotation suggests another aspect of the difference between 
negative and positive rights. Rights typically are enforceable by some 
tribunal: 
[R]ights in the full sense are legal entitlements, not just competing 
social interests or desires. So only judicial or quasi-judicial authorities 
(using reasoned elaboration of general norms to decide cases), and not 
legislatures (representing the will of the people in formulating general 
norms), are competent to decide the concrete weight to be given each 
right.54  
  
 53. Stith, supra note 36, at 857; cf. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham 
Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 916 (2013) (observing that poor countries may 
find it more challenging to fulfill positive rights than negative owing to the costs entailed 
in the former); Uchechukwu Ngwaba, The “Right to Health” as the Basis for 
Transforming the Primary Health Care System of Nigeria (Sept. 25, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2440419 (noting the aspirational and precatory nature of rights 
to health); Osiatynski, supra note 44, at 242-43 (explaining the inherent political 
contingency of positive social and economic rights); Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in 
State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 866-67 (2008) (explaining the inherent 
political contingency of positive social and economic rights); Ulrich K. Preuss, The 
Conceptual Difficulties of Welfare Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST 
APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 211, 211 (“[M]ost positive rights are different [from 
negative rights] in that their enforcement calls for government actions with are not fully 
determined by those rights, which are subject to policy choices, amenable to criteria of 
expediency and exposed to public debate.”). Certainly, there can exist against civil 
government positive rights that minimize this tentativeness and contingency. Think, for 
example, of a right that each citizen receive one dollar from the government every month. 
At least until the money runs out, fulfilling this right involves little tentativeness and 
contingency. The focus of this article, however, is positive rights of a very different sort: 
the sort of general rights to health, education, and welfare to be found in the international, 
constitutional, and statutory law of the nations of East Africa. 
 54. Stith, supra note 36, at 856. Another way of stating the first sentence of this 
quotation is, “Rights are peremptory. . . . [So a right to a social security payment, for 
example, means] that the government shall send this payment . . . , period. No questions 
asked. It is not to send the payment . . . when the government believes . . . that it would 
serve the greater good to do so or the good of the recipients. It is to send the payment, 
period.” NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 291-92 (2008). 
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In this context, general negative rights are “rights in the full sense.” But 
general positive rights are not so. They are called rights, but they likely 
receive no enforcement at law.55 Negative and positive rights against 
civil government, then, differ in fundamental respects. 
The difference between negative and positive rights appears in a 
comparison of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”)56 with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).57 These two covenants, twin offspring of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,58 largely fall on opposite 
sides of the divide between negative and positive rights. The ICCPR does 
require states parties to provide remedies,59 to outlaw slavery and forced 
labor,60 to protect everyone against certain interference or attacks by 
third parties,61 and to protect children generally,62 thereby seeming to 
secure positive rights against states parties. Nevertheless, it largely is 
  
 55. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 383, 408-09 (1996) (observing that positive constitutional rights are not 
for judicial enforcement); Preuss, supra note 53, at 211 (“[T]he courts are not competent 
actors for [the] enforcement [of positive rights].”); Sanden & Bachmann, supra note 52 
(noting that the German constitutional rights to protection against others is not as much 
legal as it is a call for protective legislation). Here lies an important distinction between a 
right and its remedy. A positive right might entail a negative remedy: the denial of a right 
to receive a dollar might be remedied by an order prohibiting the payer from striking the 
complainant from the list of payees. Likewise, a negative right might entail a positive 
remedy: the denial of the right not to be injured physically might be remedied by an order 
requiring the payment of damages. The point to be made, however, is that positive rights 
typically lack the categorical certainty of negative rights, whatever remedies might come 
into play. 
 56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 57. See ICESCR, supra note 48. 
 58. See Posner, supra note 45, at 1765; Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, 
Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South 
African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 89-90 (1992) (attributing the twinning in part 
to the circumstance that “social [i.e., positive] rights were not viewed as justiciable 
because courts, or court-like bodies, were not thought to be competent bodies to deal with 
them”). 
 59. ICCPR, supra note 56, art. 2, para. 3(a). 
 60. Id. art. 8. para. 1, 3(a). 
 61. Id. art. 17, para. 2. 
 62. Id. art. 24. 
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dedicated to securing the classic negative rights such as those against 
state deprivation of life,63 state imposition of torture or degrading 
treatment,64 state violation of liberty and personal security,65 state misuse 
of incarceration,66 state failure to adhere to fundamental procedural 
standards in administering justice,67 and state abridgement of religion,68 
of freedom of expression,69 of assembly,70 and of association.71 While the 
ICCPR expressly qualifies a few of these rights,72 others it expressly 
makes non-derogable.73 
Compare with the ICCPR the ICESCR. The latter requires states 
parties to secure a broad range of positive rights,74 such as those related 
to work,75 to social security,76 to an adequate and ever improving 
standard of living,77 to health,78 to education,79 and to benefitting from 
culture and scientific progress.80 But unlike the ICCPR with its limited 
qualifications and its set of non-derogable rights,81 the ICESCR makes 
no rights non-derogable and, to the contrary, emphasizes the general 
contingency of all the rights it secures: 
  
 63. Id. art. 6. 
 64. Id. art. 7. 
 65. Id. art. 9. 
 66. See id. art. 10, 11. 
 67. See id. art. 14, 15, 16. 
 68. Id. art. 18. 
 69. Id. art. 19. 
 70. Id. art. 21. 
 71. Id. art. 22. 
 72. See id. art. 14, 21, 22. 
 73. Id. art. 4, para. 2. 
 74. In some cases it is difficult to tell whether the ICESCR frames rights as 
positive or negative. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 48, art. 6, para. 1; art. 7, 15. This very 
difficulty only exacerbates the uncertainty and contingency of these rights that may carry 
a positive component. 
 75. See id. art. 6, 7. 
 76. Id. art. 9. 
 77. Id. art. 11. 
 78. Id. art. 12. 
 79. Id. art. 13. 
 80. Id. art. 15. 
 81. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
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  Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.82 
  Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their 
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee 
the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-
nationals.83 
  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the 
enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the 
present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far [sic] as this may be 
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.84  
  
 82. See ICESCR, supra note 48, art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. para. 3 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). In addition, as to “the right of everyone to 
education,” id. art. 13, para. 1, and specifically the guarantee that “[p]rimary education 
shall be compulsory and available free to all,” id. para. 2.a, the Covenant provides: 
 Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of 
becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan 
territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory 
primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years to 
work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed 
in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of 
charge for all. 
Id. art. 14 (emphasis added). Compare with this provision the explanation the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights offers regarding the 
obligation imposed by article 2, paragraph 1: “In interpreting States’ obligations under 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the ESC Committee states that, though a State need not 
achieve the full realization of socioeconomic rights immediately, it has an immediate 
duty to construct a program or action plan towards their realization.” Udombana, supra 
note 31, at 167 (footnote omitted).  
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Such a marked difference between the ICESCR and the ICCPR leaves 
little doubt of the fundamental distinction between negative and positive 
rights, and especially their quality as categorical or contingent.  
Positive and negative rights are so distinct that there ought to be doubt 
whether positive rights should share the celebrity of negative rights.85 
Positive rights tend to be ineffective.86 On the other hand, if actually 
fully implemented, they could work a radical social revolution that one 
suspects would lack genuine and widespread support.87 Qualities such as 
these may justly raise the question whether positive rights are worth the 
stating. Perhaps more importantly, to provide for positive rights may well 
put negative rights at risk. If some rights are contingent, strictly 
unenforceable, and have the effect more of marking an interest than of 
setting forth a rule of law, perhaps all rights will be taken to do the same. 
Even if the law distinguishes positive rights from negative in an attempt 
to isolate the categories from each other, nevertheless, both categories 
comprise rights. Rights, therefore, do not inherently establish rules of 
law. They do not grant or secure protection safe from pragmatic 
balancing and economizing. “In short, the inclusion of enforceable 
positive rights in constitutions may destroy negative rights.”88 
  
 85. “In fact, no country places social rights in the same category as political or 
civil rights—the so-called negative rights.” Pascal, supra note 53, at 865. 
 86. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 53, at 871 (“With respect to socioeconomic 
and group rights in particular, more rights on paper is associated with less respect for 
rights in practice.”). “Our findings are modestly consistent with the view that positive 
rights are harder to uphold, and thus more likely to be violated, than negative rights.” Id. 
at 916. Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-
COMMUNIST APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 225, 225 (arguing against positive 
constitutional rights as futile and dangerous). 
 87. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights, transmitted by Note of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/68/293 (Aug. 9, 2013). 
 88. Osiatynski, supra note 44, at 254. See also C. Scott Pryor, Looking for 
Bedrock: Accounting for Human Rights in Classical Liberalism, Modern Secularism, and 
the Christian Tradition, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 620 (2011) (“[O]nce a political 
system permits limits on the exercise of human rights by the political process, the risk of 
reducing rights to only one factor among many in a utilitarian calculus will quickly 
become a reality.”) (footnote omitted); Sunstein, supra note 86, at 225: 
 
64 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.1 
 
As with the rule of law, the East African context for human rights 
presents special challenges. Constitutional provisions announcing 
protection for human rights—including positive human rights—may 
sweep broad indeed.89 At the same time, actual protection may be weak, 
  
 If we look at the actual and proposed constitutions for Eastern 
Europe, we will find a truly dazzling array of social and 
economic rights. The Hungarian Constitution, for example, 
protects not merely the right to equal pay for equal work, but also 
the right to an income conforming with the quantity and quality 
of work performed. (Pause for a moment over what it would 
mean for the Hungarian Constitutional Court to take these 
provisions seriously). The Slovak Constitution right to a standard 
of living commensurate to each citizen’s potential and that of 
society as a whole [sic]. It also includes the right to just pay. 
Almost all of the actual document and proposed drafts include the 
rights to recreation, to paid holidays, to food and shelter, to a 
minimum wage, and to much more. A chaotic catalogue of 
abstractions from the social welfare state coexists with the 
traditional rights to private property, free speech, and so no. 
 I think that this is a large mistake, possibly a disaster. It seems 
clear that Eastern Europe countries should use their constitutions 
principally to produce two things: (i) firm liberal rights—free 
speech, voting rights, protection against abuse of the criminal 
justice system, religious liberty, protection from and prevention 
of invidious discrimination, property and contract rights; (ii) and 
the preconditions for some kind of market economy. The endless 
catalogue of what I will be calling “positive rights,” many of 
them absurd, threatens to undermine both of these important 
tasks. 
 89. See, e.g., Smith Otieno, Transformative Constitutionalism: Contextualizing 
Human Rights Application under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 17, (Dec. 15, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439158. The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, subscribed by all the nations of East Africa but 
for South Sudan, broadly secures both negative and positive rights, and that without 
distinction or qualification. So the right to liberty, property, and religion are secured 
along with the rights to work, health, and education on equal terms. African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, art. 6, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18 (Jun. 27, 
1981). “The Charter guarantees all categories of human rights equally.” Udombana, 
supra note 31, at 143. Again, it seems impossible that such equality would not reduce the 
protection of negative rights to that necessarily suited to positive, with consequences for 
the rule of law not difficult to predict. That South Sudan has not yet agreed to the Charter 
does not indicate its dislike of general positive rights. For example, its constitution 
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especially for positive human rights.90 In South Sudan, for example, a 
generous bill of rights appealing to Western constituencies stands 
alongside a constitution with structural provisions that establish a 
dominating national executive power equipped with prerogative more 
than enough to compromise any rights.91 It may well be true of East 
African civil governments that an inability to provide the services 
promised by positive rights leads to the formal government affirmation 
of those very positive rights: 
Already ashamed at being poor and backward, a state may sense that it 
may never have the means fully to supply all positive rights, or even 
just the right to water. Such a government may seek to prove its sincere 
intentions by abject apologies and repeated confessions of absolute 
faith in human rights, and wholesale surrender to the demands of the 
authorities claiming to articulate those rights.92  
Furthermore, the fear that providing positive rights might harm the 
protection of negative rights sadly may be well warranted in East Africa. 
The push for development in Africa has led its proponents to advance the 
claim of positive rights at the expense of negative rights, rights portrayed 
as “bourgeois” and costly to the masses, impeding the development 
desperately required for the public good.93 The state of human rights in 
East Africa appears none too good, no thanks to the inclusion of positive 
  
provides, “Every citizen has the right to have access to decent housing.” TRANSITIONAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN [CONSTITUTION] July 9, 2011, art. 34 § 
1 (South Sudan). 
 90. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 53, at 906. 
 91. See Kevin L. Cope, South Sudan’s Dualistic Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 295 (D.J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds.) 
(2013). 
 92. Stith, supra note 36, at 860. 
 93. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the 
Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1267 
(2006); cf. Frank B. Cross, International Determinants of Human Rights and Welfare: 
Law, Wealth, or Culture, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 266 (1997) (“Some suggest 
that the law’s devotion to the protection of negative human rights might actually 
undermine human welfare.”). 
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rights among those finding support on paper but lacking support much 
beyond that. 
III. EAST AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
As we have seen, the civil governments of East Africa face daunting 
challenges as they aspire to secure both the rule of law and a wide range 
of human rights. Each of these aspirations brings with it challenges of its 
own. More daunting still, however, are the challenges owing to the 
tension between these aspirations. The very commitment to securing a 
wide range of human rights contributes to the difficulty of securing the 
rule of law. 
Among the rights civil governments in East Africa pledge themselves 
to secure are broad positive rights, rights that oblige the governments by 
law to supply such goods as health, education, employment, and 
housing.94 The contingencies and qualifications entailed in these rights 
distinguish them from negative rights and yet, as explained above, at the 
same time may present a threat to negative rights.95 These factors 
likewise present a threat to the rule of law. 
One way to understand the threat positive rights present to the rule of 
law rests upon the fact, already noted,96 that positive, unlike negative 
rights,97 typically embody guaranteed results and not simply rules 
proscribing or prescribing acts. Positive rights broadly are 
“consequentialist,” and therefore “highly indeterminate.”98 These 
qualities make positive rights generally unsuited to judicial resolution,99 
  
 94. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 51-88 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 97. “One potential source of human rights and welfare is the prominence of the 
rule of law. The potential significance of law is most apparent with respect to the 
classical negative human rights, because such rights are legally defined and legally 
enforced against an infringing government.” Cross, supra note 93, at 265. 
 98. Cross, supra note 39, at 901; see also Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel 
& William J. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons 
from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 560-62 (2009); Preuss, supra 
note 53, at 211. 
 99. The whole of the Cross article, The Error of Positive Rights, argues, as its 
abstract concludes, “Should positive rights be given effect, there is a serious chance that 
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and often the very formulation of positive rights provides that courts not 
be the organ of civil government to enforce them.100 Lon Fuller captured 
the principle: “it may be said that problems in the allocation of economic 
resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for 
  
judicial intervention and enforcement of them could actually have counterproductive 
effects.” Cross, supra note 39, at 857 (emphasis omitted). See Nsongurua J. Udombana, 
Social Rights Are Human Rights: Actualizing the Rights to Work and Social Security in 
Africa, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 209 n.258 (2006) (providing sources which debate the 
justiciability of social (positive) rights.). Many suggest that positive rights are to be 
enforced ultimately by legislative, rather than judicial, action. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role 
of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1061-63, 1085, 
1091 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1403, 1414, 1430 (1999); Pascal, supra note 53, at 882, 884, 887; Mark Tushnet, 
Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1901-02 
(2004). In Keeping the Promise, Udombana opined, “There is no concrete evidence that 
judicial forays into the fields of socioeconomic [i.e., positive] rights have led to 
immediate realization of these rights, but a sustained and creative interpretation of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights will have a positive impact on State’s behavior over 
time.” Udombana, supra note 31, at 178 (footnote omitted). Scott & Macklem assert, “If 
[positive social rights are] expressly phrased as rights, even if nonjusticiable, individual 
circumstances would command greater attention in politics and policymaking as long as 
political institutions are structured or simply function in such a way that takes 
constitutional commitments seriously.” Scott & Macklem, supra note 58, at 40. They also 
assert that “the constitutionalization of social rights will place the judiciary in a new and 
unfamiliar environment. Social rights require the judiciary to explicitly adopt a 
promotional and creative stance . . . . [and] ‘to accept the realities of a changed 
conception of law . . . .’” Id. at 84. Perhaps by this they mean that “[c]ourts [are to] be 
vested with the role of prodding other branches [of civil government] in the event of 
unreasonable failures to act or in cases of inadequate action.” Id. at 134. Similarly, a 
justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa has suggested that constitutional 
positive rights may serve not “as a justiciable part of a bill of rights, but as directives of 
state policy,” Sachs, supra note 42, at 1384 (describing the situation in Ireland), or as 
providing the opportunity for a court to “declare that the [political branches] are in 
dereliction of constitutional obligation.” Id. at 1390 (describing his own South Africa). 
The universal consensus in any event seems to be that general positive rights are not 
justiciable after the usual fashion. After proposing, analyzing, and applying a subtle grid 
for understanding positive rights, distinguishing weak and strong rights and, separately, 
weak and strong remedies, Tushnet concludes, “Yet, in the end, maintaining the 
credibility of both courts and constitutions that contain social welfare rights might require 
that social welfare rights be nonjusticiable.” Tushnet, supra note 99, at 1919. 
 100. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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adjudication,”101 using “polycentric” to refer to a complex problem, the 
resolution of which has complex repercussions, all interrelated much like 
the strands of a spider web.102 Instead of adjudication, legislation or 
administration are the proper tools to be used by civil government to 
resolve polycentric problems.103 
Fuller’s discussion of polycentricity has still more to offer for the 
present discussion. Even if the sources creating positive rights against 
civil government recognize that such rights ought not to be enforced by 
courts, labeling the interests they create “rights” presents a distinct 
problem. 
A right is a demand founded on a principle—a principle regarded as 
appropriately controlling the relations of two parties. Now it is 
characteristic of a polycentric relationship that the relations of 
individual members to one another are not controlled by principles 
peculiar to those relations, just as it is impossible to build a bridge by 
establishing distinct principles governing the angle of every pair of 
girders. So in a baseball team, no one has a “right” to left field, or at 
least, no one ought to.104  
And so the problem comes with casting positive rights as “rights,” 
whether for courts or for other governmental institutions. For the law to 
label positive rights “rights” at all, causes rights to become something 
less than categorical expressions of a legal relation. It degrades rights 
into interests. 
Beyond this effect, however, if rights become interests what 
consequences follow for the rule of law? (Indeed, what consequences 
follow for law itself if rights, the creation of rules of law, become 
interests? What becomes of rules if they sketch interests instead of fixing 
rights?) 
Whether or not positive rights are for courts to enforce or instead 
become the business of some other institution of civil government, 
  
 101. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
400 (1978). 
 102. Id. at 394-405. 
 103. See id. at 398-400. 
 104. Id. at 404. 
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creating positive rights affects the health of the rule of law. For one 
thing, keeping the enforcement of positive rights from the courts does not 
automatically insulate the rule of law from the effects of positive rights. 
How the administrative state—the alternative enforcer of positive 
rights—possibly may preserve the rule of law is a vexing question.105 
Also vexing is the question whether any state given to securing positive 
rights may exist within the framework of the rule of law. 
The rule of law demands that the law fundamentally comprise rules.106 
The question arises, then, whether a civil government can secure broad 
positive rights within a system of rules.107 In words regarding general 
economic planning by civil government, but precisely appropriate to 
supplying general positive rights, Hayek wrote: 
The planning authority cannot confine itself to providing opportunities 
for unknown people to make whatever use of them they like. It cannot 
tie itself down in advance to general and formal rules which prevent 
arbitrariness. It must provide for the actual needs of people as they arise 
and then choose deliberately between them. It must constantly decide 
questions which cannot be answered by formal principles only, and, in 
making these decisions, it must set up distinctions of merit between the 
needs of different people.108  
  
 105. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976); Epstein, 
supra note 8, at 78. But see Lewans, supra note 43 (tracing Dicey’s classic criticism of 
administrative law more to his political theory than to necessary principles of the rule of 
law).  
 106. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text; see also Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 107. If the rule of law operates effectively only under the vigilance of the ruled, 
there is at least one other question on the compatibility of positive rights with the rule of 
law: “[T]here is a danger that the man in the street still comes to look at the state—source 
of so many of his most valued expectations—with a new affection that undermines the 
healthy suspicion with which the sturdy citizen of a free society should regard 
officialdom and all its works.” Jones, supra note 9, at 146. 
 108. HAYEK, supra note 5, at 113. 
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Positive rights guarantee results.109 Guaranteeing results resists reduction 
to rules of action.110 “[P]rovid[ing] for the actual needs of people as they 
arise”111 seems an intractable challenge for a regime of rules. 
The typical qualifications placed upon positive rights exacerbate this 
challenge. Here again the words of Hayek regarding the planned 
economy are no less appropriate for positive rights against civil 
government:  
[I]t becomes regularly necessary to qualify legal provisions 
increasingly by reference to what is “fair” or “reasonable”; this means 
that it becomes necessary to leave the decision of the concrete case 
more and more to the discretion of the judge or authority in question. 
One could write a history of the decline of the Rule of Law . . . in terms 
of the progressive introduction of these vague formulas into legislation 
and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty of, 
and the consequent disrespect for, the law and the judicature . . . .112  
Positive rights become matters of degree, and matters of degree are not 
the stuff of rules. Broad positive rights also demand the balancing of 
rights or even fundamental principles, an enterprise, if constitutionalized, 
sure to yield indeterminacy.113 Such balancing compounds the difficulty 
of subjecting the matter to governance by rules and, consequently, to the 
rule of law. 
Difficulties like these have led in some cases to reformulating positive 
rights against civil governments.114 Instead of guaranteeing results—the 
  
 109. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 112. HAYEK, supra note 5, at 116. See also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
LIBERTY 231-32, 257-61 (1960); HAYEK, supra note 5, at 113-21. Hayek’s fears that for 
civil government to supply the goods secured by positive rights would doom the rule of 
law did not go unanswered for long. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 9 (discussing how the 
rule of law might best be preserved in such circumstances). More recent scholarship, 
however, has supported Hayek’s view. See, e.g., Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 98; 
Preuss, supra note 53, at 219. 
 113. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 55, at 402. 
 114. Hershkoff opines that the enforcement of positive rights has enjoyed some 
measure of success, pointing out their “constitutive effect” and “expressive and solidarity 
value.” Hershkoff, supra note 41, at 828-30. 
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actual provision of education, health care, and housing, for example—
positive rights have been transformed into something less, something 
thought to be less threatening to the rule of law.115  So, a duty to 
implement positive rights becomes a duty only to make progress towards 
implementing them.116 Or the duty may be considered one only to 
provide process to the holders of positive rights.117 Such cures likely 
bring their own threats to the rule of law. To transform a right to 
something into a right that the civil government only make some 
progress towards providing that something transforms a right into an 
aspiration that resists rules. What test may the law apply to determine 
  
 115. Cf. Fuller, supra note 101, at 401 (noting the transformation of polycentric 
problems into problems more susceptible of adjudication). For example, the Constitution 
of South Sudan states, “The elderly and persons with special needs shall have the right to 
the respect of their dignity. They shall be provided with the necessary care and medical 
services as shall be regulated by law.” CONSTITUTION 2011, art. 30, § 2 (South Sudan) 
(emphasis added). In one sentence, the promise of care and medical services that are 
necessary becomes instead care and medical services that the law happens to provide. 
And sometimes purported positive rights turn out actually to be negative rights of the 
stripe frequently enforced by the courts. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION 2011, art. 34 (South 
Sudan); CONSTITUTION 2005, art. 45 (Sudan); Pascal, supra note 53, at 872-73 (describing 
how an equal protection interpretation of positive rights turns them into negative rights); 
Scott & Macklem, supra note 58, at 61-62, 74, 78 (parading negative rights as positive 
“social” rights); Udombana, supra note 31, at 180, 183. 
 116. See, e.g., Law & Versteeg, supra note 53, at 916 n.143; Pascal, supra note 53, 
at 890, 892 (describing use of the “reasonableness” standard and of “programmatic 
rights”); Sachs, supra note 42, at 1385, 1389; Scott & Macklem, supra note 58, at 75-81, 
134, 147-48 (suggesting courts not dictate the means of fulfilling positive rights but 
rather, by providing a forum “for telling . . . stories” and for discourse, promote progress 
towards their fulfillment); Tushnet, supra note 99, at 1910-11. More than one 
commentator has suggested that a celebrated South African case adopting the progressive 
approach “did little to change the status quo in South Africa with regard to a right to 
basic shelter,” the right at issue in that case. Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About 
Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 392 (2007). 
 117. See, e.g., Muchesia v. Muchesia, (2014) K.L.R. (Kenya) (converting the 
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment into a right to have a mill licensed 
before construction); Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 98, at 561; Sachs, supra note 
42, at 1385-86 (describing the right to medical care as the right to wait in a line to receive 
medical care); Scott & Macklem, supra note 58, at 82 (describing the right to food as a 
right to have the civil government engage in such conduct as performing studies, making 
plans, ensuring popular participation, and monitoring). 
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when such a right is violated? The situation is the same with 
transforming a right to an object into a right only to receive some 
government process regarding what was to be the object of the right. 
This move proffers a new right, itself not governed by rules, and so 
undercuts the very process right into which the original right has been 
transformed. These measures, again, not only deflate the concept of 
rights generally; they also present no remedy for the tension between 
positive rights and the rule of law. 
The tension between the grant of positive rights against civil 
government and subjecting civil government to the rule of law is also 
something of an irony. Presumably, rendering the welfare objectives of 
government into rights—and rights documented in formal legal 
instruments—is to elevate those objectives into legal duties. It is to lock 
the government in, as it were, to following through. The civil 
government itself becomes a lawbreaker should it not satisfy those rights. 
Positive rights take advantage of the dignity, the certainty, the authority 
of law to secure themselves against the vagaries of politics. As we have 
seen, however, transforming welfare objectives into positive rights has 
the effect more of deflating law than of elevating positive rights.118  
Positive rights thrust into the law a salient for turning law into nothing 
  
 118. See Osiatynski, supra note 44, at 246 n.20; Sunstein, supra note 86, at 229, 
232. Deflating law would seem all the more likely when general positive rights are stated 
categorically and without qualification, as for example in 2003 CONSTITUTION May 26, 
2003, art. 37 (Rwanda) (Choice of Employment, Equal Pay/Work); CONSTITUTION Aug. 
1, 2012, art. 25 (Som.) (Right to Safe Environment); id. art. 27 (Right to Clean and 
Potable Water, Right to Health Care, Right to Full Social Security); id. art. 30 (Right to 
Free Education); id. art. 31 (Language and Culture); CONSTITUTION 2011, art. 29, 30, 33 
(South Sudan) (Right to Education, Right of Persons with Special Needs and the Elderly, 
Rights of Ethnic and Cultural Communities); CONSTITUTION 2005, art. 11, 44 (Sudan) 
(Environmental & Natural Resources, Right to Education); CONSTITUTION 1977, art. 40, 
41 (Tanzania) (Clean Environment, Education and Learning). CONSTITUTION 1995, art. 
30, 33, 39 (Uganda) (Right to an Education, Rights of Women, Right to a Clean and 
Healthy Environment). Compounding the pressure arising from categorical and 
unqualified statements of general positive rights to deflate law are the almost certain 
existence of contradictory government directives involving positive rights. For example, 
compare CONSTITUTION 1995, art. 39 (Uganda) (Right to a Clean and Healthy 
Environment) with id., National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, §§ 
IX, XI, XIV (Right to Development, Role of the State in Development, General Social & 
Economic Objectives). 
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but politics. The rule of law loses all meaning when the law that rules is 
simply politics. Consequently, political elites may be all too willing to 
see positive rights secured with all the dignity that law can supply. Law 
thereby becomes a matter of negotiation, of balancing, of flexible 
aspiration—the very thing to make the rule of law impossible and their 
own power secure. If positive rights themselves are introduced into the 
very definition of the rule of law,119 political power will have gained 
complete victory, for the concept of the rule of law itself will contain its 
own neutralizing element. How can a regime be taken to task for 
violating the rule of law when the rule of law itself requires the grant of 
positive rights necessarily at odds with the core of the rule of law? 
Considerations like these heighten the general incompatibility of 
positive rights and the rule of law in East Africa. Political corruption is 
widespread in East Africa.120 Countries there rich in natural resources 
suffer from the “resource curse,” with government driven more by the 
acquisition of wealth than anything else,121 least of all sound 
administration under the rule of law. The diversity of people within 
national borders compounds this problem. “[I]t is often said that politics 
in many sub-Saharan African countries is essentially an inter-ethnic 
battle for control of the state motivated by the fact that control of the 
state apparatus creates the opportunity to transfer wealth from one group 
to another.”122 Violation of human rights is just one symptom of the 
consequent failure of civil government.123 The rule of law depends 
  
 119. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 5, at 925. 
 122. Id. at 926 (footnote omitted). 
 123. See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 8, at 1028, Otieno, supra note 89, at 7; Prempeh, 
supra note 93, at 1286-87. Other symptoms are “repression and extraction, massive 
corruption, administrative bureaucracy, enormous waste, clientelism, institutional 
collapse, poor policy performance, debt and infrastructure crisis.” Udombana, supra note 
99, at 231 (footnote omitted). 
74 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.1 
 
heavily on the commitment of governing elites to being ruled by law.124 
That commitment seems largely to be missing from East Africa.125 
For the health of the rule of law along with human rights, still more 
fundamental than the character of political leadership in East Africa is 
the culture of East Africa. 
  For the rule of law to exist, people must believe in and be 
committed to the rule of law. They must take it for granted as a 
necessary and proper aspect of their society. This attitude is not itself a 
legal rule. It amounts to a shared cultural belief. . . . 
  When this cultural belief is not pervasive, the rule of law will be 
weak or nonexistent. 
  Cultural beliefs are not subject to complete human control, so it is 
no easy matter to inculcate belief in the rule of law when it does not 
already exist. In many societies, the government is distrusted and 
recourse to the law is feared or avoided. Negative views toward the law 
are common where the law has a history of enforcing colonial or 
authoritarian rule, where legal officials are perceived to be corrupt or 
inept, where legal professionals are distrusted, or where the content or 
application of the law is seen to be unfair or identified with particular 
interests or groups within society or within the elite. 
  A widely shared cultural belief that the law should rule is the 
essential element of the rule of law—and that is the hardest to 
achieve.126  
In this passage, Tamanaha has explained deep-rooted cultural 
impediments to the rule of law, impediments well ensconced in East 
  
 124. See Carothers, supra note 10, at 96, 100; Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 5, at 
923. 
 125. For this reason, in part, some have insisted on the need for foreign impetus to 
drive rule of law reform. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 131. 
 126. Tamanaha, supra note 7, at 246-47; see also Brooks, supra note 11, at 2285, 
2298, 2301, 2322; Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 5, at 927-32; Mbaku, supra note 8, at 
988. 
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Africa.127 Of no help whatsoever in this situation is the deleterious 
complication brought by positive rights, with the further strain it places 
on the rule of law, especially where the positive rights drive a deeper 
wedge between the law and the actual acts of civil government.128 
In fact, for East African civil governments to grant broad positive 
human rights may be the move precisely contrary to securing the rule of 
law. Granting such rights is likely “only [to] provide a veneer of 
legitimacy,”129 distracting attention from the “structural 
constitutionalism” that East Africa needs,130 and that in fact would 
bolster the rule of law. A corrupt political elite, unchallenged by an 
effective political dissent, could hide under such a veneer while taking 
advantage of the very weakening of the rule of law that the grant of 
positive rights produces. This move could only exacerbate the corruption 
that itself also undermines the rule of law. At the same time, such a 
situation further increases the power of those elites, entrenching all the 
more the forces opposed to the rule of law. All this, in cultures given to 
adulating political leaders and entrusting them with vast power.131 East 
Africa, then, is positioned to suffer most from the unhappy effects upon 
the rule of law that positive human rights against civil government 
brings.132 
  
 127. See, e.g., Kristen A. Dauphinais, Training a Countervailing Elite: The 
Necessity of an Effective Lawyering Skills Pedagogy for a Sustainable Rule of Law 
Revival in East Africa, 85 N.D. L. REV. 53 (2009) (surveying challenges to the rule of law 
in East Africa with an eye toward improving legal education). 
 128. The unsettling contradiction between, on the one hand, the distrust of a civil 
government and, on the other, the reliance upon that government for fulfilling positive 
rights has not gone unnoticed. See Osiatynski, supra note 44, at 251 n.36. 
 129. David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 263, 12 (Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao 
& Massimo Renzo, eds. 2015) (writing specifically of “[a] hollow and toothless system 
of [international legal human rights]”). 
 130. Prempeh, supra note 93, at 1244. 
 131. See id. at 1260-68. “African politics breed [sic] personality cults, which are 
aided by a vast patronage network, especially in rent-seeking States that are already 
suffering from the resource curse.” Udombana, supra note 31, at 164. 
 132. The systems of customary law in East Africa further reinforce the mutually 
corrosive relation between the rule of law and positive rights against civil government. 
Customary law is an effective system. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Bifurcated Theory of 
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CONCLUSION 
The broad conception of human rights is at odds with the rule of law, 
and nowhere more than in East Africa. But that East Africa should play 
host to this unhealthy competition is not wholly of its own design. The 
impetus behind adopting the sweeping conception of human rights that 
includes broad positive rights against civil government comes from 
outside.133 To appeal to an international audience, East African countries 
have gone beyond recognizing the fundamental negative human rights 
against government lawlessness and have enshrined the full panoply of 
positive rights.134 This move has put both negative rights and the rule of 
law at risk.135  
Positive rights against civil government, if not wholly a new 
development,136 are by and large newly hatched creatures of the 
developed world.137 While perhaps positive rights might in some sense 
be honored by wealthier countries,138 less wealthy countries like those of 
East Africa will find in positive rights no benign measure. Howard, while 
explaining the international dynamic that leads countries to transplant 
such foreign elements into their own domestic law,139 notes that 
transplanting “a [legal] proposition in a different cultural, historical, or 
  
Law in Hybrid Societies, in NON-STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW: DECISION-
MAKING AT THE INTERFACE OF TRADITION, RELIGION, AND THE STATE 1, 3-4 (M. Koetter et 
al. eds., 2015) (mentioning South Sudan). Its own departure from the rule of law may not 
necessarily bode ill. Id. at 5-6, 12-16. But its availability as a good alternative to state law 
for the resolution of some disputes must contribute to the further alienation of the people 
from state law, undermining the commitment required for state law to adhere to the rule 
of law. See supra notes 35, 127 and accompanying text. Additionally, the less state law 
adheres to the rule of law, the more customary law will provide a substitute, feeding the 
cycle that weakens the rule of law. Formal positive rights are creatures of state law, not 
customary law. Consequently, the ill effects of positive rights on the legal system remain 
focused on state law, leaving customary law alone to provide an effective legal system 
free of the unlawful effects of formal positive rights. 
 133. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra Part II. 
 135. See supra Part III. 
 136. See Cross, supra note 39, at 872 n.68. 
 137. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 53, at 922. 
 139. See Howard, supra note 55, at 405-06. 
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traditional context may lead to results quite different from those one 
finds in the country from which the proposition was borrowed.” 140 
Positive rights, perhaps dangerous luxuries in the developed world and 
never gentle on the rule of law, may be toxic in East Africa. It is one 
thing for nations, having developed and become wealthy in the context of 
the rule of law, to afford not only the welfare state but also positive 
welfare rights. It is quite another to hobble efforts to establish the rule of 
law in the first place by subscribing to the general concept of positive 
rights, thereby compromising the very development and wealth 
production essential to satisfying the substance of those rights. 
Sadly, the East African embrace of positive rights perpetuates a sort 
of imperialism, with developed nations pressuring developing nations to 
conform their legal systems to those of the former. While the same may 
be said of reform to create and support the rule of law,141 the benefits of 
the rule of law for developing nations render that brand of imperialism 
more a welcome helping hand.142 With positive rights, imperialism 
smacks more of domination—or perhaps of ineptitude—than of benign 
solicitude. International pressure to grant positive rights perversely 
maintains the leverage developed nations have over developing nations 
like those in East Africa. 
The rule of law is too important, especially to developing countries, to 
be crippled by an overbroad concept of human rights. Positive human 
rights against civil government are likely to impede and not foster human 
welfare.143 The rule of law has much to do with that welfare.144 Nor is it 
  
 140. Id. at 403. 
 141. See e.g., Brooks, supra note 11, at 2280. 
 142. See RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT 
GENERATION REFORM 64-72 (2012). 
 143. “As numerous scholars have pointed out, there is no correlation between the 
constitutional language of social [i.e., positive] rights and the extent of welfare benefits 
provided by the state.” Pascal, supra note 53, at 888 (footnoted omitted). Furthermore, a 
civil government can spend lavishly on social welfare programs without entailing 
positive rights to that spending, and even apart from such lavish spending (or despite it) a 
nation and its citizens can enjoy wealth. The protections of negative rights against civil 
governments necessarily involve the conduct of civil government, but the provision of the 
goods thought to be secured by positive rights against civil government can come from 
sources other than civil government. And even if goods come from civil government, 
they need not be provided as the fulfillment of positive rights against civil government. 
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clear that for civil government itself actually to provide the objects of 
private rights truly advances human welfare.145 In fact, with the rule of 
law in place, the civil government fosters the play of other institutions far 
more effective in satisfying human needs, and often more effective by 
virtue of operating outside the constraint of the rule of law.146 A civil 
government that secures the rule of law has gone a long way to securing 
human welfare, and especially the welfare of the poor.147 Granting 
positive rights is a step in another direction. 
 
  
These facts undercut such arguments for positive rights as, “It is trite but true that many 
traditional civil liberties are illusory to those living in poverty,” Scott & Macklem, supra 
note 58, at 85, and 
Perhaps the strongest reason for including a certain number of 
[typically positive] economic and social rights is that by 
constitutionalizing half of the human rights equation [i.e., 
typically negative rights] South Africans would be 
constitutionalizing only part of what it means to be a full person. 
A constitution containing only civil and political rights projects 
an image of truncated humanity. Symbolically, but still brutally, 
it excludes those segments of society for whom autonomy means 
little without the necessities of life.  
Id. at 29. 
 144. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 145. See ROBERT NISBET WITH ROSS DOUTHAT, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY: A 
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and accompanying text. 
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